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In this thesis we develop a procedure for detecting 
erroneous payments in the Defense Finance Accounting 
Service, Internal Review’s (DFAS IR) Knowledge Base Of 
Erroneous Payments (KBOEP), with the use of supervised 
(Logistic Regression) and unsupervised (Classification and 
Regression Trees (C&RT)) modeling algorithms.  S-Plus 
software was used to construct a supervised model of vendor 
payment data using Logistic Regression, along with the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test, for testing the predictive ability of 
the model.  The Clementine Data Mining software was used to 
construct both supervised and unsupervised modeling of 
vendor payment data using Logistic Regression and C&RT 
algorithms.  The Logistic Regression algorithm, in 
Clementine, generated a model with predictive 
probabilities, which were compared against the C&RT 
algorithm.  In addition to comparing the predictive 
probabilities, Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
curves were generated for both models to determine which 
model provided the best results for a Coincidence Matrix’s 
True Positive, True Negative, False Positive and False 
Negative Fractions.  The best modeling technique was C&RT 
and was given to DFAS IR to assist in reducing the manual 
record selection process currently being used. A 
recommended ruleset was provided, along with a detailed 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1 
A. PURPOSE ............................................1 
B. BACKGROUND .........................................1 
C. RESEARCH GOALS .....................................2 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................5 
III. BACKGROUND ..............................................9 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION .............................9 
1.  Genesis of DFAS IR Seaside ....................9 
B. DESCRIPTION OF DFAS IR SEASIDE DATA MINING ........10 
1. Overview of IR Seaside’s Analytical 
Procedures ...................................10 
a. Supervised Modeling .....................10 
b.  Unsupervised Modeling ...................10 
c. Duplicate Payments ......................11 
d. Related Payments ........................12 
e. Random Records ..........................13 
2. In-Depth Review of Supervised Modeling .......13 
a. Description of Fraud Knowledge Base .....15 
b. Site Data Review and Preparation ........15 
c. Model Building and Scoring Process ......16 
d. Model Ensemble Collection ...............17 
e. Record Selection for Audits .............17 
f.  Audit Preparation .......................17 
3.   In-Depth Review of Unsupervised Modeling .....18 
a.  Shortcomings of Supervised Modeling .....18 
b.  Potential Improvements with 
Unsupervised Modeling ...................19 
C.  ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS SITE AUDITS ..................19 
1. Site Discrepancies and Corrections ...........20 
a. DFAS Charleston (June-December 03) [11] .20 
b.  DFAS Columbus (DFAS CO) (April-December 
2001) [9] ...............................20 
c. DFAS CO (October 01-September 02) [13] ..21 
d.  DFAS Kansas City (March-June 03) [12] ...21 
e.  DFAS Pacific (December 02 – March 03) 
[10] ....................................21 
2.  Final Analysis ...............................22 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................23 
A. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW .................................23 
B.   TOOLS USED FOR ANALYSIS ...........................24 
1.  Logistic Regression ..........................24 
 viii
a.  Overview ................................24 
b.  Logistic Regression Construction ........24 
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base 
Application .............................27 
2.  Hosmer-Lemeshow Test .........................27 
a.  Overview ................................27 
b.  Hosmer-Lemeshow Construction ............28 
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base 
Application .............................29 
3.  Classification Trees .........................30 
a. Overview ................................30 
b.  C&RT Construction .......................30 
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base 
Application .............................30 
d.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base 
Application .............................33 
4.  Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves 
(ROC) ........................................33 
a.  Overview ................................33 
b.  ROC Curve Construction ..................34 
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base 
Application .............................38 
d.  Implementation ..........................39 
V. ANALYSIS ...............................................41 
A.  OVERVIEW ..........................................41 
B.  LOGISTIC REGRESSION HOSMER-LEMESHOW TEST ..........41 
C.  LOGISTIC REGRESSION ...............................42 
1.  Logistic Regression Analysis Node Output .....43 
D.  CLASSIFICATION AND REGRESSION TREES (C&RT) ........44 
1.  C5.0 Training Set Analysis Node Output .......45 
E.  C5.0 AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL COMPARISON .....46 
F.   C5.0 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS .........................48 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................51 
A.  CONCLUSION ........................................51 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................51 
APPENDIX A – FIELD NAMES ....................................53 
APPENDIX B - CLEMENTINE DATA STREAM AND NODE DIALOG BOXES ...55 
A.  CLEMENTINE LOGISTIC REGRESSION STREAM EXPLANATION .55 
B.  C5.0 STREAM EXPLANATION ...........................64 
C.  C5.0 TRAIN AND TEST SET STREAM EXPLANATION ........65 
APPENDIX C - C5.0 GENERATED RULESET .........................69 
LIST OF REFERENCES ..........................................73 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 x




Figure 1. Record Selection Process Flowchart..............14 
Figure 2. A Graph of a Logit Function ...................26 
Figure 3. Classification and Regression Tree Diagram......31 
Figure 4. Setting Options for an Evaluation Chart Node....33 
Figure 5. ROC Curve Low Threshold.........................35 
Figure 6. ROC Curve High Threshold........................36 
Figure 7. ROC Curve Large Separation......................37 
Figure 8. ROC Curve Small Separation......................38 
Figure 9. Clementine Evaluation Node......................39 
Figure 10. Clementine Logistic Regression Stream...........42 
Figure 11. Clementine C5.0 Stream..........................45 
Figure 12. ROC Curve Comparison............................48 
Figure 13. C5.0 Training and Test Stream...................49 
Figure 14. Clementine Logistic Regression Stream...........55 
Figure 15. SQL Dialog Box..................................56 
Figure 16. Select Dialog Box...............................57 
Figure 17. Type Dialog Box.................................58 
Figure 18. Filter Dialog Box...............................59 
Figure 19. Logistic Regression Dialog Box..................60 
Figure 20. Logistic Regression Model Summary Dialog Box....61 
Figure 21. Analysis Dialog Box.............................62 
Figure 22. Analysis Output Dialog Box......................62 
Figure 23. Evaluation Dialog Box...........................63 
Figure 24. Evaluation Output Dialog Box....................63 
Figure 25. C5.0 Stream.....................................64 
Figure 26. C5.0 Dialog Box.................................64 
Figure 27. C5.0 Train and Test Stream......................65 
Figure 28. DM0102 Select Dialog Box........................65 
Figure 29. C5.0 Ruleset  Dialog Box........................66 































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii




Table 1. Site Audit Data.................................19 
Table 2. Coincidence Matrix as Fractions.................34 
Table 3. Analysis of DM0102 Training Set for Logistic 
Regression......................................43 
Table 4. C5.0 Analysis Node Output.......................46 
Table 5. Coincidence Matrices Comparison.................47 
Table 6. Comparison of C5.0 Training and Test Set Data...50 































I would like to thank to Professor Samuel E. Buttrey 
and Professor Lyn R. Whitaker for their guidance and 
continuous support in carrying out this thesis research. I 
would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel Chris Nelson 
and Mr. Dave Riney for their assistance and the opportunity 
to work on a project at Operations Mongoose, Defense 
Finance Accounting System, Seaside, California. Their 
extensive knowledge of Operation Mongoose was quite helpful 
in completing this thesis.   
I would like to thank all of my friends and colleagues 
for their camaraderie and good humor throughout my stay in 
Monterey.  Without this group, the past two years would 
have been assuredly longer and certainly not as enjoyable.  
Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife and 
daughters for their support. Cristina’s patience and 
understanding during this time at Monterey was the guiding 
light and pillar of strength in achieving a Master’s degree 

































The purpose of this thesis is to enhance current 
auditing techniques for detecting erroneous and fraudulent 
payments at Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) 
payment activities.  DFAS, Internal Review (IR) has been 
utilizing data mining techniques since 1999 to determine 
fraudulent and erroneous payments.  Since 2002, DFAS IR has 
built a Knowledge Base of Erroneous Payments (KBOEP) during 
their continual auditing process of DFAS payment 
activities.   
The record selection process is done by a mix of 
electronic and manual means.  Records are electronically 
selected form one of five fraud detection models and then 
the records are sorted and viewed in the Microsoft Access 
database.  Auditor experience and historical trends of 
erroneous payments provide much of the impetus for 
selecting records to be audited in the field.  Due to the 
enormous number of records needing auditing, a push towards 
a more independent, statistical base record selection 
process should be developed to uncover trends that human 
intervention cannot detect.  Models that can be developed 
and validated to select records for audit would allow the 
auditors to recoup more funds from erroneous payments.   
The goal of this thesis was to look at the KBOEP and 
to apply supervised (Logistic Regression) and unsupervised 
(Classification and Regression Trees (C&RT)) algorithms to 
generate models to perform electronic record selection.  
Various tests, such as the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test and the 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, will be 
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used to determine the strength of one technique over the 
other.  The research presented in this thesis will allow 
the DFAS IR auditors to improve an already outstanding 
operation.  These techniques should allow the auditors to 
focus more on trends that have not been captured previously 
so as to further reduce the loss of funds through erroneous 




I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to enhance current 
auditing techniques for detecting erroneous and fraudulent 
payments at Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) 
payment activities.  These efforts are lead by DFAS, 
Internal Review (IR) Seaside, also known as Operation 
Mongoose. DFAS IR has been utilizing data mining techniques 
since 1999 to determine fraudulent and erroneous payments.  
Since 2002, DFAS IR has developed a database of known 
erroneous payments during their continual auditing process 
of payment activities.  This database is examined to 
improve the current auditing process used by the DFAS 
auditors.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The IR Seaside Office was put into operation to detect 
fraudulent payments within the Department of Defense’s 
(DOD) payment activities. The investigative team’s original 
name was Operation Mongoose.  It was noted during an 
analysis conducted by Oxendine [1] that numerous fraud 
problems were occurring within the DOD in the mid-1990’s.   
Operation Mongoose utilized new data mining technology 
to search the vast numbers of DFAS vendor pay transactions 
for potentially fraudulent payments.  Of these payments, 
sixteen were prosecuted successfully for fraud.  The 
Operation Mongoose team determined from its knowledge base 
that there were four fraud types that could be used as a 
foundation for building supervised classification and 
prediction models.  DFAS IR absorbed Operation Mongoose in 
1999, along with the work of conducting audits of payment 
2 
records in search of Conditions Needing Improvement (CNI), 
overpayments, detection of duplicate payments and 
potentially fraudulent behavior.  IR Seaside does not 
conduct the audits, but assists the auditors in 
understanding the data mining techniques and collects audit 
results for future analysis. 
C. RESEARCH GOALS 
 This paper will enhance existing manual auditing 
techniques and identify areas for improvement.  The 
development of models that can search field payment records 
electronically will aid in reducing the manual process of 
searching through a database for erroneous or fraudulent 
payments, allowing the auditors to focus more on the audits 
themselves.  In this thesis, we will look at which 
statistical analysis technique will work best in developing 
and enhancing existing erroneous payment models. 
Chapter I and II provide an introduction and 
background to DFAS IR’s operation.  In Chapter III, we 
include a brief review of the data mining techniques used 
by DFAS IR and how they were developed.  This review 
includes both supervised and unsupervised modeling 
techniques and a review of previous site audits conducted 
by DFAS IR for 2002 and 2003.  In Chapter IV, we include a 
thorough review of the techniques to be used.  These 
techniques are Logistic Regression, Classification Trees, 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test and Receiver Operating Characteristic 
curves.  These tools help develop the predictive models for 
improving the manual audit selection process for one of 
five DFAS IR fraud models.  In Chapter V, a thorough review 
of the results of the analysis is performed, a statistical 
technique is chosen and a model is recommended for 
3 
selecting erroneous payments electronically.  Finally in 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As noted in the General Accounting Office Report, GAO-
02-069G, Strategies to Manage Improper Payments:  Learning 
from Public and Private Sector Organizations, improper 
payments are a widespread and significant problem in the 
federal government and among states, foreign governments, 
and private sector companies.  While in the private sector 
improper payments most often present an internal problem 
that threatens profitability, in the public sector they can 
translate into serving fewer recipients or represent 
wasteful spending or a higher relative tax burden.  These 
wasteful and erroneous payments prevent taxpayer resources 
from meeting the missions and goals of the Department of 
Defense.  The root causes of improper payments can normally 
be tracked to a lack of, or a breakdown in, internal 
controls.  The risk of improper payments increases in 
programs with complex criteria for computing payments, a 
significant volume of transactions, or emphasis on 
expediting payments. [4] 
Internal controls are not one event, but a series of 
actions and activities that occur throughout companies 
operations.  People make internal controls work, and 
responsibility for good internal controls rests with all 
managers. [5]   No matter how all-inclusive the auditing 
techniques are, they require knowledgeable, diligent and 
ethical people to perform the auditing process.   
Fraudulent and erroneous payments are a problem not 
only in the DOD, but in the civilian sector as well.  It is 
important to understand that too close relationships 
between companies and auditors are occurring today in the 
6 
civilian sector and having an impact on the integrity of 
the auditing process.  The Arthur Anderson and ENRON 
auditing scandal exemplifies this problem of poor audit 
controls.  In a proportion common to the Big Five 
accounting firms, half the $52 million a year Arthur 
Andersen collected from ENRON was for its accounting 
services, and the other half was for its consulting 
business. [17] As these relationships occur it is important 
to develop auditing techniques that will attempt to detect 
trends in large volumes of data.  As payments are made 
electronically, the need to analyze and detect 
irregularities in those payments increases.  The lack of 
consistent and independent audits among large corporations 
may lead to fraudulent behavior not being kept in check or 
detected.  The audit process for civilian and public sector 
financial transactions should be kept separate and distinct 
from the activity under audit in order to maintain 
financial integrity.   
The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 
conducted a study of the techniques used by government 
agencies to detect or prevent fraud and improper payments. 
[4] The study cites a number of activities that are using 
data mining to detect abnormalities.  For instance, the 
Illinois Department of Public Aid applies data mining 
techniques to detect fraudulent billing and kickback 
schemes.  Another case reveals how the Texas Health and 
Human Services Commission is using neural networks to 
identify fraudulent claims. The Texas commission 
successfully identified over six million dollars for  
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recovery in fiscal year 2000.  The GAO also reports on a 
number of other institutions and the data mining techniques 
used in fraud detection efforts. [2] 
Several theses at the Naval Postgraduate School have 
looked at improving the audit process for DFAS IR.  Jenkins 
[2] looked at DFAS IR’s use of data mining techniques to 
analyze millions of vendor transactions each year in an 
effort to combat fraud.  The long timeline required to 
investigate potential fraud precludes DFAS from using fraud 
as a supervised modeling performance measure, so instead it 
uses the conditions needing improvement (CNI) found during 
site audits.  The research evaluated supervised models to 
determine if models improved with each new audit and 
proposed four initiatives to enhance the modeling process: 
a revised model scoring implementation, a knowledge base of 
audit results, alternative model streams for record 
selection and a recommended modeling process for the CNI 
knowledge base.  
Roulliard [8] proposed a standardized procedure for 
detecting fraud in DFAS vendor payment transactions through 
unsupervised modeling (cluster analysis). Clementine Data 
Mining software was used to construct unsupervised models 
of vendor payment data using the K-Means, Two Step, and 
Kohonen algorithms. Cluster validation techniques were 
applied to select the most useful model of each type, which 
were then combined to select candidate records for physical 
examination by DFAS auditors. The unsupervised modeling 
techniques utilized available valid transaction data, much 
of which is not admitted under the current supervised 
modeling procedure. He demonstrated a new clustering 
approach called Tree Clustering, which used Classification 
8 
and Regression Trees to cluster data with automatic 
variable selection and scaling.  
A Knowledge Base of Erroneous Payment data has been 
collected at DFAS IR and it is this data base that will be 
evaluated to further enhance the auditing process at DFAS 
IR. It is important to develop sound auditing techniques 
both in the private and public sectors to achieve cost 
savings and to minimize fraudulent behavior. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1.  Genesis of DFAS IR Seaside 
DFAS is one of the largest accounting agencies in the 
world, disbursing nearly one billion dollars every business 
day.  DFAS was formed in January 1991 to eliminate 
redundant disbursement activities within the Defense 
Department.  In Jenkins [2], Evaluation of Fraud Detection 
Data Mining Used in the Auditing Process of the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service, it was noted that prior to 
DFAS’s inception, DOD had 338 accounting and finance 
offices worldwide.  This excessive number of systems and 
personnel cost the government 3.1 billion dollars per year 
in fixed overhead. In addition to this overhead, the large 
bureaucracy and the lack of standardization left the 
Defense Department vulnerable to fraud.   
Most of the fraud cases found during the early and 
mid-1990’s were discovered by accident, a situation that 
pointed to systematic problems in the DOD payment system. 
[1] This problem has been continually addressed since that 
time with improved internal controls, operational audits 
and system standardization.  However, more proactive 
techniques were needed to actively fight fraudulent 
activity.  In 1994 Congress created a new unit, called 
Operation Mongoose, whose sole purpose was to develop 
methods to detect and prevent fraud. [1] After some 
reorganization, in the late 1990’s, Operation Mongoose 
became the Seaside branch of DFAS IR.  DFAS IR agents work 
closely with the Defense Manpower and Data Center (DMDC) 
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agency to gather data appropriate for analysis.  DFAS IR 
assists the audit process with data analysis by searching 
for problem transactions such as duplicate payments, 
overpayments and fraud.  The synergy developed by tying 
together these multi-agency functions has resulted in 
millions of dollars in duplicate payments being recovered, 
the initiation of fraudulent payment investigations and the 
improved ability of auditors to identify Conditions Needing 
Improvement at DFAS payment centers. [3] 
B. DESCRIPTION OF DFAS IR SEASIDE DATA MINING 
1. Overview of IR Seaside’s Analytical Procedures 
IR Seaside uses several different analytical 
techniques to identify problem payments.  Before each site 
audit is conducted, the preceding eighteen months of site 
data is compiled for analysis.  The IR audit coordinator 
will decide how many records will be selected for screening 
for a detailed audit with a typical breakdown of 30% 
duplicate payments, 30% supervised records, 10% 
unsupervised records, 20% related records and 10% random 
records.  A brief description of each technique used is 
given below: 
a. Supervised Modeling 
The data miners use a knowledge base of 
fraudulent and erroneous payments to build predictive 
models. [2] Using this information they are able to develop 
models to aid in predicting erroneous payments that could 
lead to detecting fraudulent behaviors. 
b.  Unsupervised Modeling 
This type of modeling covers all other areas not 
covered by supervised modeling.  Some of the techniques 
used to date include clustering and pseudo-supervised 
clustering.   
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c. Duplicate Payments 
These types of payments are made to a vendor, 
under a valid contract, that has already been paid.  DFAS 
IR currently has five fraud payment models that are used 
for selection of records to be audited.  The models are set 
up such that if two or more records have the same payment 
field information, then there is a good chance that the 
payments were erroneous, fraudulent or both. 
(1) DM0102 – Duplicate Payments.  This 
model compares the Purchase Item Identification Number, 
Delivery Order Number, Invoice Number, Invoice Amount and 
Disbursing Office Voucher Amount plus Discount minus 
Interest payment fields. 
(2) DM0109 – Duplicate Payments.  This 
model compares the Purchase Item Identification Number, 
Delivery Order Number, Invoice Number, Invoice Amount, 
Disbursing Office Voucher Amount plus Discount minus 
Interest and Merchandise Delivery Date payment fields.  The 
difference from the DM0102 model is that the Merchandise 
Delivery Date is compared, also. 
(3) DM0110 – Exigency Contract Duplicate 
Payments.  This model compares the Invoice Number, Invoice 
Amount and Disbursing Office Voucher Amount plus Discount 
minus Interest payment fields.  The difference from the 
DM0102 model is that the Purchase Item Identification 
Number and Delivery Order Number are not compared. 
(4) DM0111 – High Dollar Duplicate Invoice 
Amount.  This model looks at Purchase Item Identification 
Number, Delivery Order Number, Same Invoice Number, Invoice 
Amount and Disbursing Office Voucher Amount plus Discount 
minus Interest.  The difference from the DM0102 model is 
that the Invoice Number is not compared. 
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(5) DM0210 – Exigency Contract Duplicate 
Payments.  This model compares the Invoice Amount, Invoice 
Date, Invoice Amount (greater than $200.00) and Disbursing 
Office Voucher Amount plus Discount minus Interest payment 
fields.  The difference from the DM0102 model is that the 
Purchase Item Identification Number, Invoice Number and 
Delivery Order Number are not compared.  The DM0102 
Duplicate Payment Model will be analyzed in this thesis.   
To identify duplicate payments the DFAS IR team 
evaluates all payments made at a DFAS site.  This technique 
is initially computer-intensive in the comparison of all 
records with specific matching rules developed by the IR 
auditors.  Site records are compared pair-wise and several 
new record fields are generated.  The new fields indicate 
whether a record shares traits in common with another 
record in the database.  If two records are nearly 
identical then they are flagged as a potential erroneous 
payment.  The DFAS IR auditors apply the five fraud models 
to determine whether records deserve attention during 
upcoming site visits. Duplicate payments have been the most 
productive and visible aspect of their data mining work 
with over $75 million dollars recovered to date. [3]   
d. Related Payments 
These payments are records that are “related” to 
the records selected by the supervised models.  When the 
supervised modeling process selects a record, a Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) query then finds all other 
records related to the suspect record in the fields of 
payee, contract, address, or electronic fund transfer 
number.  All the related records are documented and the 
information is brought to the site audit.  The related 
13 
records may or may not be reviewed during the site audit 
depending on whether the audit reveals problems with its 
associated supervised record or if the data mining team 
deems the record to be interesting. [2] 
e. Random Records 
This method has been the traditional way of 
choosing records for DFAS audits.  DFAS IR accomplishes 
random selection by assigning each record a random number 
from one to the number of records.  The records are sorted 
by random numbers and the records with smallest numbers are 
selected until the desired number of records is obtained. 
2. In-Depth Review of Supervised Modeling 
Figure 1 shows the logical process for choosing the 
supervised versus unsupervised, random and duplicate record 
selection.  This is how DFAS IR prepares for each pay site 
audit.  The remainder of this section will explain the 




Figure 1.   Record Selection Process Flowchart 
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a. Description of Fraud Knowledge Base 
The fraud knowledge base used in the supervised 
model comes from the known prosecuted fraudulent activity.  
This knowledge base consists of 453 transactions from 16 
known fraud cases. [6] At the beginning of Operation 
Mongoose, these records from cases were collected from DMDC 
or from the actual transactions.  The data was analyzed 
using principal component analysis along with clustering 
techniques to group the payments for easier classification. 
[6] This resulted in the fraudulent payments being broken 
down into four fraud “types” for modeling purposes.  These 
types were labeled as Big Systematic (BigSys), Small 
Systematic (SmallSys), Opportunistic (Ops), and Piggyback 
(Piggy).[2]  The difference between BigSys and SmallSys is 
the dollar amount, but both are due to errors in the 
procedural payments on behalf of DFAS pay sites to the 
vendors. Opportunistic payments are where the vendor 
resubmits for a manual payment after having already 
received an electronic payment.  The Piggyback scenario 
occurs when the vendor will try to submit for a 
consolidated payment under one request and then request a 
payment on one of the smaller line items within a contract 
with a separate request.  An example of this is when there 
is an extra charge for exceeding a household goods weight 
requirement.  The charge is lumped into the initial request 
and then a separate invoice is made for the amount that 
exceeds the weight requirement. 
b. Site Data Review and Preparation 
As with any application, it is important to 
verify data integrity before performing an analysis.  Prior 
to modeling any site data, the statistical information for 
each field is compiled and reviewed by the senior data-
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miner.  The senior data-miner then releases a comprehensive 
spreadsheet with recommendations as to which fields to 
avoid or to use in model development.  Serious data 
integrity issues are reported to DMDC so the responsible 
site can be informed of the data entry problems that need 
to be addressed at the site. [2] This initial step of 
cleaning prevents the analysis from having to be repeated 
later.  The next step is to break the data into three 
subsets: training, test and validation.  The training set 
is used to construct models, which are then tested using 
the test set and evaluated using the validation set. [2] 
c. Model Building and Scoring Process 
The data is divided and distributed to several 
data miners to disperse the workload for model development.  
The data miners use the Clementine data mining software to 
build the models using methods ranging from linear and 
logistic regression to neural networks.  The data mining 
efforts have primarily used classification trees for their 
ease of understanding and neural networks for their ease of 
use. [7] At this point the data miners will use their 
knowledge of previous site audits to build what they 
consider the best models and provide a scoring for each of 
the models that are developed. 
When the data mining project began, the analysts 
lacked feedback regarding the effectiveness of their 
models.  Therefore, they designed an ad hoc scoring 
function that has been in use ever since.  After building a 
satisfactory model on the training data, the modelers run 
the test and validation datasets through the model.  The 
results are contingency tables with counts distributed by 
rows of known fraud status and columns of predicted fraud 
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status for the test and validation sets.  One major 
assumption is made when applying the known fraud label: 
that none of the sampled site data is fraudulent.  Given 
the large number of payments and the belief that most 
payments are not fraudulent, this assumption is reasonable. 
[2] The data miners are able to compare all models on one 
single spreadsheet.  The scores are then used as an 
objective factor in the subjective selection of models for 
the site’s supervised ensemble.  
d. Model Ensemble Collection 
All the models are gathered together and selected 
based on the objective score, along with the intent to 
evenly distribute splits, modelers and classification 
methods.  After the models are selected this information is 
put into Clementine and the software selects the records to 
be chosen for auditing.  
e. Record Selection for Audits 
Once the modeling process has been completed, the 
entire 18-month database of site records is run through the 
model ensemble.  Each model classifies each record and the 
predicted fraud classifications for each record are 
counted.  A true simple majority-voting scheme would 
classify all records that receive a majority vote as 
potentially fraudulent and worth review.  However, audit 
team resources and time are limited, so only a fixed number 
of records can be selected. [2]  
f.  Audit Preparation 
Records selected by the different techniques are 
referred to as candidates.  The data mining team sends the 
candidate list back to DMDC.  DMDC then prepares and 
returns a list of the candidates and any related records to 
DFAS IR.  Approximately two weeks prior to the site visit, 
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DFAS IR forwards the candidate list to the audit site so 
that the record’s documentation can be prepared for 
presentation upon the audit team’s arrival. [2] 
3.   In-Depth Review of Unsupervised Modeling 
An important class of unsupervised learning is cluster 
analysis or data segmentation.  Cluster analysis is used to 
describe a data set in its entirety, grouping together 
similar observations into distinct clusters.  The 
“distance” between clusters depends on their degree of 
dissimilarity; observations that fall into two clusters 
that are “close together” are more similar to one another 
than observations from clusters that are “far apart.”  Some 
measure of the similarity between observations must be 
calculated in order to find clusters in the data set.  Most 
clustering algorithms utilize a numeric matrix (called a 
similarity or dissimilarity matrix) to represent the 
distances between observations. Thus any non-numeric 
variables must be coded numerically in terms of similarity 
or dissimilarity.  The reader interested in a detailed 
account of unsupervised modeling is referred to Hand [18].   
a.  Shortcomings of Supervised Modeling 
The primary shortcoming of the supervised 
modeling methodology currently in place is that models are 
developed from possibly outdated, incomplete or potentially 
misclassified Knowledge Base (KB) information.  
Additionally, the supervised modelers at Operation Mongoose 
work very hard to create complex models and combinations of 
models that consistently perfectly predict all the KB 
transactions of a particular type.  Success with the KB 
transactions is unlikely to translate into success for new 
transactions for such complex models. 
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Although the population data is randomly divided 
among the data splits, the assignment of KB transactions to 
the data splits is predetermined.  This brings into 
question the validity of the predictions made by the 
resulting models. [8] Given historical trends of erroneous 
and fraudulent behavior, the modelers are trying to focus 
their analysis on specific payment fields.  This approach 
may overlook other relationships that may be useful in 
predicting fraudulent or erroneous payments. 
b.  Potential Improvements with Unsupervised 
Modeling 
The primary potential improvement with 
unsupervised modeling is the ability to exploit all the 
data in the population without regard to the Knowledge 
Base.  Additionally, an unsupervised model may reveal 
actual patterns in the population data, independent of the 
preconceived (and potentially incorrect) fraud 
classifications in the KB. [8] 
C.  ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS SITE AUDITS   
This analysis considers five pay activities in the 
DFAS payment system; the findings are displayed in Table 1.  
The total duplicate payment shows the result of each 
payment sites audit.  The percentage of transactions that 
were found to have erroneous payments is relatively small 












Value Percentage of Disbursed
DFAS Charleston Jun-Dec03 1.30$          80 $6,471,482.00 0.50%
DFAS Columbus Apr-Dec 2001 1.50$          60 $1,297,900.00 0.09%
DFAS Columbus Oct01-Sep02 83.60$        70 $8,370,296.00 0.01%
DFAS Kansas City Mar-Jun03 0.47$          96 $6,058,036.00 1.30%
DFAS Pacific Dec02-Mar03 3.60$          85 $1,588,514.00 0.04%  
Table 1.   Site Audit Data 
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1. Site Discrepancies and Corrections 
a. DFAS Charleston (June-December 03) [11] 
(1) Description of Audit Discrepancies.  
DFAS Internal Review identified erroneous payments 
primarily caused by either certification office errors or 
data input errors.  DFAS Charleston’s vendor pay management 
was unable to obtain adequate supporting documents for 80 
potentially erroneous payments processed by DFAS 
Charleston.  The structure of duties related to running the 
duplicate payment query and investigating the possible 
duplicates was not consistent with the standard structure 
developed.  
(2) Correction.  Recovered overpayments and 
increased vigilance from management. 
b.  DFAS Columbus (DFAS CO) (April-December 
2001) [9] 
(1) Description of Audit Discrepancies.  
The most common erroneous payment was due to a lack of 
audit controls for duplicate FEDEX payments which caused 
the payment office not to be aware of 11 of 60 duplicate 
payments, totaling $37,643. Offsets were made against 
pending invoices at Federal Express (FEDEX) and Air Force 
Materiel Command (AFMC), rather than forwarded to DFAS CO 
to be entered into the payment system as debits and 
credits.  Therefore, the payment office has no valid audit 
trail for disbursements and collections that have been 
offset by FEDEX or AFMC. 
(2) Correction.  Recovered overpayments and 
ensured that DFAS CO receives invoices for entering into 




c. DFAS CO (October 01-September 02) [13] 
This audit dealt with identifying problems in a 
large multi-million dollar pre-payment contracts. 
(1) Description of Audit Discrepancies.  
The cause of most overpayments involved duplicate invoicing 
by contractors of additional fabricated shipments.  The 
current system’s edit and prepayment reports were not 
designed to detect duplicate payments involving different 
shipment numbers where the Invoice Number is not the same. 
(2) Correction.  Internal Review Seaside 
has developed fraud detection models that can identify 
these potential overpayments.  Like previous models 
developed with the collaboration of the DFAS CO Systems and 
the Quality Directorate, the model is intended to assist in 
the creation of a prepayment report that will help to 
detect these payments with particular characteristics 
before payment. 
d.  DFAS Kansas City (March-June 03) [12] 
(1) Description of Audit Discrepancies.  
The Vendor Pay managers indicated that duplicate payments 
resulted from voucher examiner errors, duplicate invoice 
submissions by the activity, certification office error, 
contracting officer error, data input error, system 
problems and Electronic Fund Transfer accounts expiring. 
(2) Correction.  Recovered overpayments and 
increased vigilance from management in the above-mentioned 
areas. 
e.  DFAS Pacific (December 02 – March 03) [10] 
(1) Description of Audit Discrepancies. 
Incorrectly entered dates caused duplicate payment edits to 
fail and not be properly identified as erroneous payments.  
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Both vendors and payment activities submitted duplicate 
invoices, which caused the duplicate errors. 
(2) Correction.  Recovered overpayments and 
provide training for personnel to look through dataset of 
invoices to determine possible duplicate payments. 
2.  Final Analysis 
A common theme throughout the five site audits was 
that the majority of erroneous payments were due to a lack 
of controls and oversight at the DFAS payment sites.  As 
noted in Table 1, the percentage of erroneous payments 
captured ranged from .01 to 1.32 % of the total disbursed.  
This appears to be an insignificant amount in comparison to 
the total disbursed, but total dollar value of erroneous 
payments recouped was roughly $ 23.79 million.   
Are the techniques being used to determine fraudulent 
and erroneous payments effective?  Although these 
techniques have recouped these overpayments, the degree to 
which they are effective cannot be determined.  As time 
passes and data is collected, will the effectiveness of 
these techniques be determined?  Vigilance and sound 
metrics by management and DFAS IR will assist in these 
efforts.  Most of the problems with the erroneous payments 
seem to be a function of poor audit and quality assurance 
checks by management at the DFAS pay sites.  Each activity 
can look at placing more emphasis on detecting fraudulent 
vendor payment patterns by applying rigorous training and 
auditing of erroneous payment transactions.   
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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. ANALYSIS OVERVIEW 
DFAS IR auditors now have a Knowledge Base of 
Erroneous Payments (KBOEP) have been verified by actual on-
site audits.  This database identifies those payments that 
money was recouped as a result of these audits.  Data 
mining at DFAS IR has progressed to the point where the 
staff is efficient at data review, modeling and record 
selection. [2] The goal is to reduce the time required to 
manually select records by developing software models to 
pre-select records for site audits.  Fraud prosecution is 
very important, but it will not be the main motivation 
behind developing these models.  Jenkins [2] states, 
“Because of the long time required between identifying 
potentially fraudulent records, investigation and 
prosecution, it is impractical to use this as a performance 
measure.”  Davia [9] resoundingly rejects fraud detection 
as a performance measure because of the historical 
difficulty of prosecuting fraud.  He points out that 
proactive fraud auditing’s greatest strength lies not in 
its ability to detect fraud, but more in its deterrent 
aspects.  If the selection processing of very large data 
set can be improved and the manual time spent looking 
through records reduced, then the auditors may spend more 
time focusing on looking at fraudulent, behavior patterns. 
The next step for DFAS IR is to take this KBOEP and 
determine if they can replace their current manual pre-
audit record selection with an electronic record selection 
process.  Several statistical techniques will be used to 
look for trends within the KBOEP.  The current database 
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consists of records that have been selected and audited, 
and money recovered, from various payment sites.  The 
records have been labeled with a 1 (Success) when the 
record produced an erroneous payment and a 0 (Failure) for 
those that did not. This field name is called the ‘Target’ 
and will be referenced throughout.  Logistic Regression 
(supervised modeling) along with the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 
for validity, Classification and Regression Trees (C&RT) 
and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are used 
to develop and test the strength of the predictive models.  
Appendix A shows the fields to be used in the analysis.   
B.   TOOLS USED FOR ANALYSIS 
1.  Logistic Regression 
a.  Overview 
Many questions in science involve trying to 
predict the probability that something will happen, for 
example, the probability that people will vote for one of 
two candidates or that someone will have AIDS.  Such 
questions involve two-category (dichotomous) Y variables 
for example, vote/no vote or AIDS/no AIDS.  In this thesis 
the dichotomous relationship is erroneous payment/non-
erroneous payment.  The erroneous payment will have a Y 
value of 1 or 0.  
b.  Logistic Regression Construction 
Hamilton [15] shows that the simple linear 
regression model is appropriate for relating a quantitative 
response variable Y to a quantitative predictor X.  Suppose 
that Y is a dichotomous variable with possible values 1 and 
0 corresponding to Success and Failure, and let P=P(Y=1).  
The value of P will depend on the value of some 
quantitative variable X.  For example, the probability that 
a car needs warranty service of a certain kind might well 
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depend on the car’s mileage or the probability of avoiding 
an infection of a certain type might depend on the dosage 
in an inoculation.  Instead of using just the symbol p for 
the success probability, now use p(X) to emphasize the 
dependence of this probability on the value of X.  The 
simple linear regression equation  
 1ˆ oY Xβ β ε= + +  (4.1) 
is no longer appropriate.   
P(Y=1) denotes the probability that a {0,1} Y 
variable equals 1.  The probability that Y does not equal 1 
is  
 ( 1) ( 0) 1 ( 1)P Y P Y P Y≠ = = = − =  (4.2) 
The odds favoring Y = 1 are 




=Θ = = − =  (4.3)  
Odds range from 0(when P(Y=1)=0 to ∞ (when 
P(Y=1)=1).   
Suppose Y = 1 indicates that it rains today and Y 
= 0 indicates that it does not.  If the probability of rain 
today is P(Y=1) = 0.2, then the probability of no rain is 
1-P(Y=1)=0.8.  The odds of rain today are  
 0.2 1 0.25
0.8 4
= = =  (4.4) 
These odds could be stated as 0.25 to 1 or 1 to 
4.  Thus a 0.25 probability amounts to 1-to-4 odds.  By 
taking the natural logarithm of the odds, we obtain a 
logit: 
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⎧ ⎫= Θ = ⎨ ⎬−⎩ ⎭ (4.5) 
Logits range from -∞ (when P=0) to ∞ (when P=1).  
Logit regression refers to models with a logit as left-
hand-side variable:  
 0 1 1 2 2 1 2, 1i i i K i KL X X Xβ β β β − −= + + + +"  (4.6) 
If the logit (L) is a linear function of X 
variables, then the probability (P) is a non-linear, S-
shaped function like that in Figure 2.  Predicted 
probabilities approach, but never reach or exceed, the 
boundaries of 0 and 1.  Thus logit regression provides a 
more realistic model for probabilities than linear 
regression does.   
 
 











Given a set of X values and estimated 
coefficients, we can estimate logits ( Lˆ) much as we do Yˆ  
in linear regression.  Reversing the logit transformation 






= +  (4.7) 
This re-expression is useful for graphing.  Unless X 
strongly affects Y, graphing Pˆ  over the data’s X range will 
not show a complete S-curve; instead it will be a partial 
curve of Figure 2.   
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base Application 
A Logistic Regression model will be developed by 
separating the Fraud Type Indicator DM0102 from the KBOEP 
data into a training and test set.  The training set will 
generate a model for the separated data and will be 
compared against the test set for accuracy of predictions.   
2.  Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 
a.  Overview 
Hosmer and Lemeshow [20] provide an interesting 
approach to evaluating the quality of logistic regression.  
After a model is built a predicted probability is generated 
for every observation.  These predictions are sorted and 
divided into g groups of approximately equal size according 
to their predicted probability.  Once the groupings are 
done a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test is performed. Using 
an extensive set of simulations, they demonstrated that 
when the groupings are done properly and the fitted 
logistic regression model is the correct model, the test 
statistic is well approximated by the Chi-square 
distribution with g-2 degrees of freedom, F2(g-2). [20] 
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b.  Hosmer-Lemeshow Construction 
Separating the estimated probabilities into n 
columns, where the first column corresponds to the smallest 
value and the nth column to the largest value.  Two 
grouping strategies were proposed: (1) collapse the table 
based on percentiles of the estimated probabilities and (2) 
collapse the table based on fixed values of the estimated 
probability. [20]  
With the first method, use of g = 10 groups 
results in the first group containing the n1’ = n/10 
subjects having the smallest estimated probabilities and 
the last group containing the n10’ = n/10 subjects having 
the largest estimated probabilities.  With the second 
method, use of g = 10 groups results in cutpoints defined 
at the values k/10, k = 1, 2… 9 and the groups contain all 
subjects with the estimated probabilities between adjacent 
cutpoints.  For example, the first group contains all 
subjects whose estimated probability is less than or equal 
to 0.1, while the tenth group contains those subjects whose 
estimated probability is greater than 0.9.  Now, building a 
new table with two rows, with a y = 1 row, estimating the 
expected value obtained by summing the estimated 
probabilities over all subjects in a group and a y = 0 row, 
estimating the expected value of obtained by summing, over 
all subjects in the group, one minus the estimated 
probability.  For either grouping strategy, the Hosmer-
Lemeshow goodness-of-fit statistic, Ĉ, is obtained by 
calculating the Pearson Chi-square statistic from the 2 x g 
table of observed and estimated expected frequencies.  A 
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= ∑  (4.10) 
is the average estimated probability within group k. [20] 
At this point we have a table of observed and 
estimated expected values within each grouping.  The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test statistic is computed 
from the frequencies in the table.  A F p-value close to 
one is indicative of a good-fitting model.  The best F for 
a given dataset may be more a function of the environment 
being tested in some cases may not be close to 1.0.  A more 
detailed development of the Hosmer-Lemeshow and the F 
goodness-of-fit test can be found in [20]. 
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base Application 
Once the Logistic Model has generated the 
predicted probabilities, the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test, using a 
function built by Professor Samuel Buttrey, is run to 
determine the goodness-of-fit.  See Appendix B for 





3.  Classification Trees 
a. Overview 
As described in [18], The Classification and 
Regression Trees (C&RT) algorithm is a widely used 
statistical procedure for producing Classification and 
Regression models with a tree-based structure.  They are 
non-parametric supervised procedures to explain and predict 
the response variable based on one or more input variables.  
For this discussion, consider only the classification 
aspect of C&RT, which is mapping an input vector X to a 
categorical (class) output label Y.   
b.  C&RT Construction 
The structure of the tree is derived from the 
data; C&RT works by choosing the best variable for 
splitting the data into two groups at the root node.  It 
can use any of several different splitting criteria; all 
produce the effect of partitioning the data at an internal 
node into two disjoint subsets (branches) in such a way 
that the class labels in each subset are as homogeneous as 
possible This splitting procedure is then recursively 
applied to the data in each of the child nodes and so on.  
The size of the final tree is a result of a relatively 
complicated “pruning”, process, outlined in [18], chapter 
5.   
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base Application 
The type of C&RT that will be used in the 
Clementine software will be the C5.0 algorithm. It builds a 
decision tree or ruleset, by splitting the sample based on 
the field that provides the maximum information gain. Each 
subsample defined by the first split is then split again, 
usually based on a different field, and the process repeats 
until the subsamples cannot be split any further.  Finally, 
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the lowest level splits are reexamined and those that do 
not contribute significantly to the value of the model are 
removed or pruned. 
The uniqueness of the C5.0 algorithm is that it 
can provide two kinds of models, a decision tree and a 
ruleset.  The decision tree is straightforward, because it 
provides a description of the data by separating the data 
into respective terminal, or “leaf” nodes, each describing 
a particular subset of training data.  Any observation in 
the training data belongs to exactly one terminal node in 
the tree.  The Target variable is the detection of an 
actual erroneous payment found by auditors at DFAS payment 
sites, a one if an erroneous payment is found and a zero 
otherwise.  In Figure 3, the node graph shows a portion of 
a generated symbolic target field.  The graph is a chart of 
percentages in each category of the Target field.  
Preceding each row in the table is a color swatch that 
corresponds to the color that represents each of the target 
field categories in the graphs for the node.  In this case 
a zero (light blue) or one (red).  
 
Figure 3.   Classification and Regression Tree diagram 
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The Taxpayer Identification Number Difference 
field (TINDiff) has been selected as the first field to 
begin with.  The chart within the Node 0 box indicates the 
proportion of zeroes and ones and their relationship to 
Target variable.  Node 1 represents the Invoice Date 
Difference (InvDtDiff) field’s relationship to TINDIFF and 
the Target variable.  Node 2 represents the Check Date 
Difference (ChkDtDiff) field’s relationship to TINDiff and 
the Target variable.  The splits can be divided into a 
minimum of two to a maximum of eight subsets in the 
Clementine software.   
Clementine can also generate a ruleset for use in 
selecting records can be selected electronically.  The 
Clementine User’s Guide [7] defines a ruleset as a set of 
rules that tries to make predictions for individual 
records.  Rulesets are derived from decision trees and, in 
a way, represent a simplified or distilled version for the 
information found in the decision tree.  Rulesets can often 
retain most of the important information from a full 
decision tree but with a less complex model.  Rulesets do 
not have all of the same properties as decision trees.  The 
most important difference is that with a ruleset, more than 
one rule may apply for any particular record, or no rules 
at all may apply.  If multiple rules apply, each rule gets 
a weighted “vote” based on the confidence associated with 
that rule and the final prediction is decided by combining 
the weighted votes of all of the rules that apply to the 
record in question.  If no rule applies, a default 
prediction is assigned to the record. The Clementine Users 
Guide [7] provides a detailed explanation of selection 




Figure 4.   Setting Options for an Evaluation Chart Node 
 
d.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base Application 
A C&RT model was developed by separating the 
DM0102 KBOEP data into a training and test data set.  The 
training set was set aside in order to develop a model to 
predict the ‘Target’ variable.  The pruning severity and 
minimum records per child branch were adjusted to see which 
mix will provide the best result.  This is akin to setting 
the threshold level for splitting the tree into its 
respective branches.  The test set model was run to compare 
its predictive ability against the training set.   
4.  Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves (ROC) 
a.  Overview  
ROC curves were developed in the 1950's as a by-
product of research into making sense of radio signals 
contaminated by noise. More recently they have found 
usefulness in many statistical applications. [19] The 
curves are generated to assist in the understanding of the 
coincidence (confusion) matrices.  A coincidence matrix 
looks like the one in Table 2.  In this table, True 
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Positive Fractions (TPF) represents those records that are 
erroneous payments and have a “high” test (above whatever 
cutoff level was chosen).  FPF represents false positives, 
where the test has told us that a non-erroneous payment was 
really erroneous.  The True Negative Fraction (TNF) 
represents correctly identified Non-Erroneous Payments and 
the False Negative Fraction (FNF) represents erroneous 
payments incorrectly classified as being non-erroneous.   
 
Actual Target vs test 
  Erroneous Payment No Erroneous Payment 
"high" test (positive) TPF FPF 
"low" test (negative) FNF TNF 
"high" and "low" test refers to value relative to some arbitrary cutoff point. 
FNF+TPF =1 / TNF + FPF =1 
 
Table 2.   Coincidence Matrix as Fractions 
 
Some coincidence matrices display not the 
fractions but the actual number of records that were 
identified.  The Clementine software generates coincidence 
matrices in this manner and the fractions are easily 
calculated and displayed separately.   
b.  ROC Curve Construction 
Central to the idea of ROC curves is this idea of 
a cutoff level. A test is declared "positive" if the value 
is above some arbitrary cutoff, and "negative" if below.  
An example is shown in Figure 5.  The elliptical shape 
shows the location of the vertical line that intersects the 
bell shaped curves and this serves as the cutoff point.  In 
Figure 5 the vertical line threshold (Test value>) is very 
high (to the right of the two bell-shaped curves), which 
results in almost no false positives, and very few true 
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positives, as noted by the circle’s position on the ROC 
curve in Figure 5.  Both TPF and FPF will be close to zero, 
so we are at a point close to (0,0) on the ROC curve.   
 
 
Figure 5.   ROC Curve Low Threshold [19] 
 
In Figure 6, we move the vertical line test 
threshold towards a more reasonable, lower value (to the 
left), so that the number of true positives will increase 
(rather dramatically at first, as the ROC curve moves up 
steeply). Finally, a point is reached on the ROC curve 
where there is a remarkable increase in false positives.  
The ROC curve slopes off as we move our test threshold down 
to very low values.  Again the vertical line threshold 
(cutoff) corresponds to ellipse’s location on the bell-
shaped curves and the circle on the ROC curve. 
36 
 
Figure 6.   ROC Curve High Threshold [19] 
 
This shows the impact of changing the threshold 
level.  Making the cutoff too high corresponds to lower TPF 
and FPF, but making it too low results in high TPF and high 
FPF, both of which are undesirable.  Any choice of cutoff 
level produces a tradeoff in assessing your models ability 
to predict outcomes.  Ideally you want to choose a cutoff 
point that will give you the highest TPF with the smallest 
FPF. 
The next step is to look at the effect of 
changing the overlapping bell-shaped curves and its affect 
on the ROC curve. An example from [19] provides an 
intuitive feel for the effects the bell-shaped curves have 
upon the ROC curve.  Consider two tests. The first test is 
good at discriminating between patients with and without a 
disease. This will be test A. The second test is bad at 
discriminating between patients with or without a disease.  
This will be test B. Let's examine each:  
Test A, Figure 7, shows the bell-shaped curves 
are now moved apart and the arrows point to the area 
defined by TPF and FPF, respectively.  With this amount of 
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separation between the bell-shaped curves the ROC curve has 
a large area between the straight line and the knee shaped 
curve.  This separation provides a higher TPF (0.978) to 
FPF (0.225) mix.  We want both a high TPF and a low FPF, so 
that the model predicts relatively well.  We want to choose 
a cutoff level on the ROC curve that keeps the TPF high, 
while keeping the FPF low.  This point would be at the knee 
of the upper curve of the ROC curve.  These are the 
characteristics of a good ROC curve. 
 
 
Figure 7.   ROC Curve Large Separation [19] 
 
Test B, Figure 8, shows that the bell-shaped 
curves are almost overlapping and the arrows point to the 
area defined by TPF and FPF, respectively.  Because of the 
lack of separation of the bell-shaped curves, the ROC 
curves are relatively close to one another.  As we plot the 
graph on the ROC curve we can see that for every true 
positive that moves up we are likely to encounter a false 
positive that moves us to the right. This results in more 
or less of a diagonal line from the bottom left corner of 
38 
the ROC curve, up to the top right corner.  The model’s 
ability to discern between a TPF or FPF will almost be 
equal.  These are the characteristics of a poor test. 
 
 
Figure 8.   ROC Curve Small Separation [19] 
 
From the above scenario you can get a good 
intuitive feel that the closer the ROC curve is to a 
diagonal, the less useful the test is at discriminating 
between the two populations. The more steeply the curve 
moves up and then (only later) across, the better the test. 
A more precise way of characterizing this "closeness to the 
diagonal" is simply to look at the area under the ROC 
curve. The closer the area is to 0.5, the poorer the test 
performs, and the closer it is to 1.0, the better the test 
performs. 
c.  Vendor Payment Knowledge Base Application 
In the Clementine User’s Guide [7], the ROC curve 
is generated in the Analysis Node and is called the Gain 





Figure 9.   Clementine Evaluation Node 
 
d.  Implementation 
We run the Logistic Regression and C&RT nodes to 
develop a model to generate the probabilities for 
predicting the Target variable of 1 or 0.  Once the 
probability results are generated the Evaluation Node is 
run and an ROC curve is developed for both analysis tools.  





















































A.  OVERVIEW 
The analysis that follows will consist of a discussion 
of the Logistic Regression, Hosmer-Lemeshow Test performed 
in the statistical software package S-Plus and Logistic 
Regression and C&RT analysis in the Clementine software 
package. 
The section on Logistic Regression analysis in the S-
Plus software will discuss the model generated and the 
results from the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test.  The section on 
analysis in the Clementine software will begin with 
Logistic Regression and C&RT applied to the DM0102 dataset.  
The resultant analysis will compare each model’s ability to 
predict the Target field’s binary outcome.  In addition to 
this analysis, a comparison of the Receiver Operator 
Characteristic curves will be done to assist in providing 
insight into the models ability to generate the TPF, TNF, 
FPF and FNF. 
Once a statistical tool is selected, the data set will 
be further examined to see how it performs individually by 
breaking the DM0102 dataset into Training and Test set. 
B.  LOGISTIC REGRESSION HOSMER-LEMESHOW TEST 
A Logistic Regression model was developed in the 
statistical software package S-Plus and this model was 
tested using the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test. The test showed that 
the F goodness-of-fit was zero.  This was an indication 
that the model that was generated would not perform well.  
Some attempts were made to eliminate fields and models were 
generated again and tested with the same resultant zero 
goodness-of-fit.  We conclude that the logistic regression 
42 
models were not predicting probabilities of duplicate 
payment accurately.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow Test does seem, at 
least roughly, to rank the predictions properly.  This 
information would be useful in assessing thresholds of the 
model’s ability to predict.  This test was abandoned and 
other statistical tools were pursued to aid in determining 
the model’s ability to predict. 
C.  LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
In building this model the dependent listed variable 
is the Target field with the other 26 fields, in Appendix 
A, performing as the independent (In) variables.  See 
Figure 10 for the Logistic Regression Clementine Stream.   
 
 
Figure 10.   Clementine Logistic Regression Stream 
 
For the Logistic Regression Node, Model options are 
selected from among Main Effects, Full Factorial and 
Custom.  The Main Effects model includes the input fields 
individually and does not test interactions between input 
fields, whereas the Full Factorial includes all two-term 
interactions.  The Full Factorial models are better able to 
capture complex relationships, but are also much more 
difficult to interpret and more likely to suffer from 
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overfitting. [7] The Main Effects model was selected for 
its ease of model development and understanding.   
1.  Logistic Regression Analysis Node Output 
The Analysis Node output in Table 4 shows that the 
Logistic Regression Node correctly predicts 81.55% of the 
3773 records.  The percentages for the Coincidence Matrix 
are displayed as well.  The TPF and TNF are fairly high, 
and will be compared to the C&RT Analysis Node output to 
determine the tool which is more effective at predicting 
Erroneous Payments.  Only a training set model of the 3773 
records will be generated for comparison to the C&RT model. 




















EP* (1) NEP* (0)
TPF FPF1 71.38% 16.60%
FNF TNF
28.62% 83.40%0
*note:  EP is Erroneous Payment/NEP is Non-Erroneous 
Payment
 




D.  CLASSIFICATION AND REGRESSION TREES (C&RT) 
The Clementine software package offers both a 
Classification and Regression Tree Node and a C5.0 
algorithm that can build a decision tree or a ruleset.  I 
have chosen to use the C5.0 algorithm, because of its good 
performance.  The C5.0 model tends to be easier to 
understand than some other model types, since the rules 
derived from the model have a very straightforward 
interpretation.   
The decision tree is a description of the splits found 
by the algorithm.  Each terminal or “leaf” node describes a 
particular subset of the training data and each case in the 
training data belongs to exactly one terminal node in the 
tree.  In other words, exactly one prediction is possible 
for any particular data record presented to a decision 
tree. [7] 
The ruleset is a set of rules that tries to make 
predictions for individual records.  Rulesets are derived 
from decision trees and in a way represent a simplified or 
distilled version of the information found in the decision 
tree.  Rulesets can retain most of the important 
information from a full decision tree, but with a less 
complex model.  Because of the way rulesets work, they do 
not have the same properties as decision trees.  The most 
important difference is that with a ruleset, more than one 
rule may apply for any particular record or no rules at all 
may apply.  If multiple rules apply, each rule gets a 
weighted “vote” based on the confidence associated with 
that rule and the final prediction is decided by combining 
the weighted votes of all of the rules that apply to the 
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record in question.  If no rule applies, a default 
prediction is assigned to the record. [7] 
The ruleset provides the analyst and the decision 
maker the opportunity to look at a generated ruleset in 
total and determine which part adds more value to the 
analysis.  This would help give some insight into trends 
within the data.  Figure 12 shows the Clementine C5.0 
Stream.  Appendix C shows the generated ruleset. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Clementine C5.0 Stream 
 
1.  C5.0 Training Set Analysis Node Output 
This initial Training Set is generated for comparing 
to the Logistic Regression model.  Once a modeling tool is 
selected a Training and Test Set is generated to check the 
models ability to predict.  The Analysis Node output shows 
that the C5.0 Node will correctly predict 93.56% of the 
3773 records.  The pruning severity and node splitting were 
selected to maximize the predictive ability of the C5.0 
stream for this data set.  The values selected for the best 
pruning severity and node split mix were 75% and 3, 
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respectively.  The percentages for the Coincidence Matrix 

















Predicted Probability with Target value
3530 93.56%
EP* (1) NEP* (0)
1 TPF FPF92.16% 6.11%
FNF TNF 
7.84% 93.89%0
*note:  EP is Erroneous Payment/NEP is Non-
Erroneous Payment
 
Table 4.   C5.0 Analysis Node Output 
 
E.  C5.0 AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL COMPARISON 
Taking the data from Sections B and C, a side by side 
comparison will be performed to determine the best model to 
predict the dependent, Target field variable.  From Table 
5, one can see that the C5.0 is preferred with a correct 
classification rate of 93.56% over an 81.55% predicted 
probability for Logistic Regression.  In addition, is that 
the TPF value is clearly higher in the C5.0 Coincidence 
Matrix over the Logistic Regression. The FPF and FNF are 
smaller which shows that the numbers of false predictions 
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would be lower with this model.  Clearly the C5.0 is the 




1 0 1 0
1 764 180 1 414 530
0 65 2764 0 166 2663
Coincidence Matrix Coincidence Matrix
Coincidence Matrix Coincidence Matrix
3773 3773
243 6.44% 696 18.45%
3530 93.56% 3077 81.55%
C5.0 Logistic Regression
Comparing Predicted Probability with 
Target value
Comparing Predicted Probability with 
Target value
Actual Actual









1 1TPF FPF TPF FPF92.16% 6.11% 71.38% 16.60%
FNF TNF FNF TNF
7.84% 93.89% 28.62% 83.40%
*note:  EP is Erroneous Payment/NEP is No Erroneous Payment
0 0
 
Table 5.   Coincidence Matrices Comparison 
 
In addition to the previous information, the ROC 
curves in Figure 12 enhance the Coincidence Matrix 
analysis, by showing that the curve on the left, (C5.0), 
has a larger area underneath the upper curve.  As discussed 
in Chapter III, section 4(b), the closer the upper curve is 
to the straight line, the stronger the evidence that the 
TPF and FNF are almost equal.  This is not a desirable 
characteristic for an ROC curve.  The further these lines 
are apart the better.  The one that performs better is used 
to determine the cutoff point for the predictive 
probabilities.  The curve on the left (C5.0) is the better 




Figure 12.   ROC Curve Comparison 
 
F.   C5.0 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The Training and Test Stream is shown in Figure 13.  
This stream generates a C5.0 Train and C5.0 Test output 
which will be used to determine if the pruning severity and 
node split works well on a test set of the overall dataset.  
The parameter values of best pruning severity equal to 75% 
and node split equal to 3 were determined for the training 
set, and will be applied to both the Train and Test data.    
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Figure 13.   C5.0 Training and Test Stream 
 
The Training and Test Sets are generated randomly with 
a 75/25 split and the C5.0 node run with a 75/3 pruning 
severity and node split.  The results for the Training and 
Test Sets are shown in Table 6.  The results show predicted 
probability of 92.73 % and 87.45 % for the Training and 
Test Set, respectively, a difference of approximately 5 %.  
The model performed well.   
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Table 6.   Comparison of C5.0 Training and Test Set Data 
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis was to look at the Knowledge 
Base of Erroneous Payments (KBOEP) and generate models for 
duplicate payments.  These models were then compared and 
the best one was selected based on its predictive ability. 
The C5.0 algorithm provided the best results and the most 
flexibility in generating a ruleset.  Because of the 
continual working environment of the auditing process the 
model’s ruleset may change as the KBOEP grows and more 
analysis will have to be done to see if the model’s 
predictive ability changes as well. 
DFAS has made positive contributions to the auditing 
of payments for goods and services within the DOD.  It is 
clear that the administrative portion of auditing vendor 
payments is a critical piece of performing our role as good 
stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to validate the usefulness of the best model 
selected, DFAS IR should employ this model in parallel with 
their current manual record selection process.  The process 
should compare manually selected records to electronic 
records and an analysis done on which technique performed 
better.  The on-site audits will validate the 
successfulness of the models capturing the right records 
for erroneous payments.   
We recommend using more C&RT techniques on the master 
database from which the KBEOP was drawn to see if new 
models can be developed to validate or enhance the current 
ones used for detecting erroneous payments.  The master 
52 
database should be analyzed using both supervised and 
unsupervised algorithms to determine the validity of 
current fraud detection models and to gain insight into new 
fraudulent behaviors.   
A final area to look at would be to run the Logistic 
Regression and C&RT algorithms to determine and develop 
models for the DM0109, DM0110, DM0111 and DM0210 fraud 
detection models, in addition to the master database.   
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APPENDIX A – FIELD NAMES 
Field Name Field Abbreviation Type Values
Target Target Flag 1/0
Number In Group NumInGrp Numeric [2,3,4,5,7]
Invoice Date Difference InvDtDiff Numeric [0,610]
Invoice Received Difference InvRcvdDiff Numeric [0,439]
Merchandise Accepted Date 
Difference MdseAccDtDiff Numeric [0,610]
Merchandise Delivered Date 
Difference MdseDelDtDiff Numeric [0,621]
Check Date Difference ChkDtDiff Numeric [0,609]
Payment Method Difference PmtMethDiff Flag 1/0
Manual Indicated Difference ManIndDiff Flag 1/0
Electronic Fund Transfer  
Accounting Difference EFT_AcctDiff Flag 1/0
Electronic Fund Transfer 
Return Difference EFT_RtnDiff Flag 1/0
Tax Identification Number 
Difference TINDiff Flag 1/0
Remit to Difference Rmt_ToDiff Flag 1/0
Remit Line 1 Difference Rmt_L1Diff Flag 1/0
Remit Line 2 Difference Rmt_L2Diff Flag 1/0
Remit City Difference Rmt_CityDiff Flag 1/0
Remit Zip Difference Rmt_ZipDiff Flag 1/0
Maximum Invoice Received 
versus Invoice date MaxInvRcvdvsInv_dt Numeric [1,2245]
Minimum Invoice Received 
versus Invoice date MinInvRcvdvsInv_dt Numeric [1,2245]
Appropriation Identification 
Difference Appr_IDDiff Flag 1/0
Appropriation Fiscal Year 
Difference Appr_FYDiff Flag 1/0
Appropriation Limit Difference Appr_LimtDiff Flag 1/0
Line of Accounting Difference LoaDiff Flag 1/0
Reissue Rejected Reissue_Reject Flag 1/0
Electronic Fund Transfer 
Rejected EFTRej Flag 1/0
Manual Payment Man_Pymt Flag 1/0
Maximum Invoice Amount Max_INV_AMT Numeric [200.00, 1,847,128.00]  
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APPENDIX B - CLEMENTINE DATA STREAM AND NODE DIALOG 
BOXES 
This appendix will explain the Clementine applications 
and Dialog boxes used in this thesis.  




Figure 14.   Clementine Logistic Regression Stream 
 
Each icon in Figure 14 is known as a node.  Dialog 
boxes are generated for each node in order to change 
certain features of that node.  As each node is explained 
for a Clementine stream it will not be explained throughout 
the rest of this Appendix.  The Database (SQL), Select, 
Type and Filter Nodes are the same throughout.   
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Figure 15.   SQL Dialog Box 
 
The Database Node allows the user to import data from 
a variety of other packages, including Excel, MS Access, 
Dbase, SAS (NT version only), Oracle and Sybase, using the 
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Figure 16.   Select Dialog Box 
 
The Select Node allows the user to select or discard a 
subset of records from the data stream based on a specific 
condition, such as selecting the DM0102 fraud model from 




Figure 17.   Type Dialog Box 
 
The Type Node can specify a number of field 
properties.  Most important are the Type and Direction 
fields.  The Type field is used to describe characteristics 
of the data in a given field such as Flag, Range, Discrete, 
Set or Typeless.  The Direction section is used to tell the 
Modeling Nodes whether fields will be Input (predictor 
fields) or Output (predicted fields) for a machine learning 
process.  Both and None are also available directions. 
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Figure 18.   Filter Dialog Box 
 
The Filter Node has three functions: filter (or 
discard) fields, rename fields and map fields.  In this 
thesis, 20 of 48 fields were filtered, because they were 





Figure 19.   Logistic Regression Dialog Box 
 
The Logistic Regression Node works by building an 
equation that relates the input field values to the 
probabilities associated with each of the output field 
categories.  Once the model is generated, it can be used to 
estimate probabilities for new data.  For each record, a 
probability of membership is computed for each possible 
output category.  The target category with the highest 




Figure 20.   Logistic Regression Model Summary Dialog Box 
 
Figure 20 is an example of the output of the Logistic 










Figure 21.   Analysis Dialog Box 
 
The Analysis Dialog Box in Figure 21 allows the user 
to specify the details of the analysis by generating 
coincidence matrices, performance evaluations and 
confidence figures.  Figure 22 shows an example of the 
output that is generated. 
 
 




Figure 23.   Evaluation Dialog Box 
 
Figure 23 shows the Evaluation Chart Dialog Box that 
offers an easy way to generate, evaluate and compare 
predictive models to choose the best model for your 
application.  Evaluation charts show how models perform in 
predicting particular outcomes.  They work by sorting 
records based on the predicted value and confidence of the 
prediction, splitting the records into groups of equal size 
(quantiles) and then plotting the value of the business 
criterion for each quantile, from highest to lowest. [7] An 
example of an ROC Curve is shown in Figure 24.  
 
 




B.  C5.0 STREAM EXPLANATION 
The C5.0 Node is explained in detail in Chapter IV(C).   
 
Figure 25.   C5.0 Stream 
 
 
Figure 26.   C5.0 Dialog Box 
 
Figure 26 shows the dialog box and the fields where 
the pruning severity and minimum number of fields to split 




C.  C5.0 TRAIN AND TEST SET STREAM EXPLANATION 
Figure 26 shows the stream that examines the strength 
of the C5.0 model and its ability to predict the outcomes.   
 
Figure 27.   C5.0 Train and Test Stream 
 
 
Figure 28.   DM0102 Select Dialog Box 
 
Figure 28 shows the Select Node Dialog Box 
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Figure 29.   C5.0 Ruleset  Dialog Box 
 
Figure 29 is the Dialog Box for the selecting the 
ruleset parameters within the C5.0 Node.  Boosting and 
Cross validation are explained in detail in the Clementine 




Figure 30.   C5.0 Ruleset Output  
 
This is an example of the output generated by 
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APPENDIX C - C5.0 GENERATED RULESET 
Rules for 1 - contains 13 rule(s) 
Rule 1 for 1 (150, 0.901)  
  if InvRcvdDiff <= 98 
  and TINDiff = 1 
  and Max INV AMT > 511.54001 
  then 1 
Rule 2 for 1 (41, 0.86)  
  if MdseAccDtDiff <= 9 
  and ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and PmtMethDiff = 0 
  and EFT AcctDiff = 0 
  and EFT RtnDiff = 0 
  and MinInvRcvdvsInv dt <= 3 
  and Max INV AMT > 741 
  then 1 
Rule 3 for 1 (11, 0.846)  
  if MdseAccDtDiff > 9 
  and ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and ChkDtDiff <= 3 
  then 1 
Rule 4 for 1 (4, 0.833)  
  if ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and EFT AcctDiff = 1 
  and EFT RtnDiff = 0 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  and Max INV AMT <= 1915 
  then 1 
Rule 5 for  1 (140, 0.824)  
  if MdseAccDtDiff <= 9 
  and ManIndDiff = 0 
  and Rmt L2Diff = 1 
  then 1 
Rule 6 for  1 (149, 0.815)  
  if MdseAccDtDiff <= 9 
  and ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and PmtMethDiff = 0 
  and EFT RtnDiff = 1 
  and Rmt L1Diff = 1 
  and Appr IDDiff = 0 
  then 1 
Rule 7 for  1 (40, 0.81)  
  if ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and ManIndDiff = 0 
  and Remit ToDiff = 0 
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  and Man Pymt = 1 
  then 1 
Rule 8 for  1 (34, 0.806)  
  if MdseAccDtDiff <= 9 
  and ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and ManIndDiff = 0 
  and EFT RtnDiff = 0 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  and Remit ToDiff = 1 
  then 1 
Rule 9 for  1 (3, 0.8)  
  if ChkDtDiff > 10 
  and ManIndDiff = 1 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  and Rmt L2Diff = 1 
  then 1 
Rule 10 for  1 (3, 0.8)  
  if ChkDtDiff > 116 
  and ManIndDiff = 1 
  then 1 
Rule 11 for  1 (19, 0.762)  
  if InvRcvdDiff <= 0 
  and MdseAccDtDiff <= 9 
  and ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and ManIndDiff = 0 
  and EFT RtnDiff = 0 
  and Appr FYDiff = 1 
  then 1 
Rule 12 for  1 (45, 0.745)  
  if ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and ManIndDiff = 0 
  and Man Pymt = 1 
  then 1 
Rule 13 for  1 (129, 0.695)  
  if InvRcvdDiff > 0 
  and MdseAccDtDiff <= 9 
  and ChkDtDiff > 0 
  and EFT AcctDiff = 0 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  then 1 
Rules for 0 - contains 7 rule(s) 
Rule 1 for  0 (819, 0.985)  
  if ChkDtDiff <= 116 
  and ManIndDiff = 1 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  and Rmt L2Diff = 0 
  then 0 
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Rule 2 for  0 (846, 0.982)  
  if MdseAccDtDiff <= 9 
  and PmtMethDiff = 1 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  and Rmt L2Diff = 0 
  then 0 
Rule 3 for  0 (42, 0.955)  
  if InvRcvdDiff <= 0 
  and Remit ToDiff = 0 
  and MinInvRcvdvsInv dt <= 3 
  and Max INV AMT <= 741 
  then 0 
Rule 4 for  0 (286, 0.951)  
  if EFT RtnDiff = 1 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  and Rmt L1Diff = 0 
  then 0 
Rule 5 for  0 (246, 0.923)  
  if ChkDtDiff <= 0 
  then 0 
Rule 6 for  0 (1,042, 0.922)  
  if InvRcvdDiff <= 0 
  and EFT AcctDiff = 0 
  and Remit ToDiff = 0 
  and MinInvRcvdvsInv dt > 3 
  and Appr FYDiff = 0 
  and ApprLimtDiff = 0 
  then 0 
Rule 7 for  0 (194, 0.867)  
  if MdseAccDtDiff > 9 
  and ChkDtDiff > 3 
  and TINDiff = 0 
  and Man Pymt = 0 
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